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Reflections on the 25th Anniversary of the U.S. Supreme
Court's Decision in Board of Education v. Rowley
Mitchell L. Yell, Antonis Katsiyannis, and Michael Hazelkorn
June 22, 2007, was the 25th anniversary of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Board of Education ofthe Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley^ (hereafter
Rowley; 1982). In Rowley, the Supreme Court interpreted congressional intent in requiring
that public schools provide a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to students with
disabilities under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). This ruling—
which is arguably the most important special education decision by the high court—has
had a profound effect on the education of students with disabilities.
In this article we reflect on the importance of this decision and discuss how changes
in IDEA in the 1997 and 2004 reauthorizations have changed the definition of a FAPE.
First, we briefly review passage of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act^
(EAHCA) in 1975. Second, we examine the facts of the Rowley case and the Supreme
Court's ruling. Third, we look at some court cases following Rowley, which interpreted the
meaning ofthe Supreme Court's ruling. Fourth, we consider the effects of IDEA 1997 and
2004 on the meaning of FAPE. Finally, we discuss principles that school districts should
follow when developing individualized education programs (IEPs) that provide a FAPE for
students with disabilities.
THE EDUCATION FOR ALL HANDICAPPED CHILDREN ACT OE 1975
Prior to 1975, the access of students with disabilities to educational opportunities
was limited in two major ways (Katsiyannis, Yell, & Bradley, 2001; Yell, Drasgow,
Bradley & Justesen, 2004):
1. Many students were excluded completely from public schools. In fact, congres-
sional findings in 1974 indicated that more than 1.75 million students with disabil-
ities did not receive educational services.
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2. More than 3 million students with disabilities who
were admitted to school did not receive an education
that was appropriate to their needs.
To address these problems, on November 29, 1975, Presi-
dent Gerald Ford signed into law the most significant
increase in the role of the federal govemment in special edu-
cation to date—EAHCA.
The EAHCA combined an educational bill of rights with
the promise of federal fmancial incentives. The Act con-
tained provisions requiring that states, to receive federal
funding, had to develop laws and regulations ensuring that
all eligible students with disabilities would receive a special
education. The EAHCA required participating states to pro-
vide a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for all qual-
ified students with disabilities between the ages of 3 and 18
by September 1, 1978, and for all students up to age 21 by
September 1, 1980. Further, the EAHCA mandated that eli-
gible students with disabilities had the right to a FAPE.
Focuson
Exceptional
cnlldFen
ISSN 0015-51IX
FOCUS ON EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN (USPS 203-360) is pub-
lished monthly except June, July, and August as a service to teachers,
special educators, curriculum specialists, administrators, and those con-
cerned with the special education of exceptional children. This publica-
tion is annotated and indexed by the ERIC Clearinghouse on Handi-
capped and Gifted Children for publication in the monthly Current
Index to Journals in Education (CUE) and the quarterly index. Excep-
tional Children Education Resources (ECER). The full text of Focus on
Exceptional Children is also available in the electronic versions of the
Education Index. It is also available in microfilm from Serials Acquisi-
tions, National Archive Publishing Company, P.O. Box 998, Ann Arbor,
MI 48106-0998. Subscription rates: individual, $42 per year; institu-
tions, $56 per year. Copyright © 2007, Love Publishing Company. All
rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or part without written permis-
sion is prohibited. Printed in the United States of America. Periodical
postage is paid at Denver, Colorado. POSTMASTER: Send address
changes to:
Love Publishing Company
Executive and Editorial Office
P.O. Box 22353
Denver, Colorado 80222
Telephone (303) 221-7333
EDITORIAL BOARD
Lisa Dieker
University of Central Florida
Paula Maccini
University of Maryland
Marleen Pugach
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
Carrie E. Watterson
Editor
Stanley F. Love
Publisher
FAPE
The EAHCA defined a FAPE as special education and
related services that
(A) are provided at public expense, under public supervision
and direction, and without charge,
(B) meet standards of the State educational agency,
(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or sec-
ondary school education in the state involved, and
(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized edu-
cation program. (IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § l401(a)(18))
The key to providing a FAPE was for school personnel to
develop and implement a program based on a full and indi-
vidualized assessment of a student that would consist of spe-
cially designed instruction tailored to meet the unique needs
of a child with a disability (IDEA, 20 U.S.C, § 1401(a)(16)),
What would constitute an appropriate education, therefore,
would vary from student to student.
To ensure that each student covered by the EAHCA
would receive an individualized FAPE, Congress required
that an individualized education program (IEP) be devel-
oped for all students in special education. The special edu-
cation and related services for a student would be delineated
in, and provided in conformity with, the student's IEP. Thus,
the IEP was tbe blueprint of a student's FAPE.
When writing the original EAHCA, however. Congress
did not define a FAPE in a manner that listed the actual sub-
stantive educational requirements. Rather, Congress defined
a FAPE primarily in accordance with the procedures neces-
sary to ensure that parents and school personnel would col-
laborate to develop a student's program of special education.
Congress believed that requiring IEPs to be developed in
this manner would ensure a FAPE. Thus, the definition of a
FAPE in the original EAHCA was primarily procedural
rather than substantive.
In the years following passage of the EAHCA, the ques-
tion of what exactly constituted a FAPE generated much dis-
cussion, controversy, and debate. Although the free educa-
tion and the public education parts of a FAPE were rarely
disputed, what an appropriate education would be for any
given child was the frequent subject of due process hearings
and court cases (Wenkart, 2000). The most important case
regarding FAPE was heard by the U.S. Supreme Court on
March 22, 1982—the Rowley case.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THF
HENDRICK HUDSON CENTRAL SCHOOL
DISTRICT V. ROWLEY (1982)
Nancy and Clifford Rowley had both become deaf as the
result of childhood diseases. They had a son, John, who had
normal hearing, and a daughter, Amy, who also was born
with normal hearing. Amy, like her parents, lost her hearing
to a childhood disease. Amy's parents brought her up using
manually coded English, lipreading, and amplification of
her residual hearing. Both of the Rowley's children were
extremely bright; Amy's IQ was above 120 (Smith, 1996).
A little more than a year before their daughter was to enter
kindergarten, Nancy Rowley met with the principal of the
Furnace Woods Elementary School in the Hendrick Hudson
Central School District, Montrose, New York. Nancy, a certi-
fied teacher of deaf students, wanted Amy to attend Furnace
Woods and also to be mainstreamed into general education
with a sign language interpreter in the classroom.
The other option that had been discussed was to send Amy
to the New York School for the Deaf Although the School for
the Deaf had many services available, including sign lan-
guage interpreters, a committee for the education of students
with disabilities in the Hendrick Hudson School District ruled
out this option because it did not believe the school could
meet Amy's academic needs. During this time, the state of
New York was still developing regulations to implement the
EAHCA; nevertheless, the concept of mainstreaming was not
new either to the principal or the committee members.
The meeting between Nancy Rowley and the Furnace
Woods principal, Joe Zavarella, went well, although Ms.
Rowley noted that the principal believed the school district
might resist providing an interpreter. Mr. Zavarella later
wrote to Ms. Rowley, explaining that a number of
approaches would be used to make Amy's experiences at
Furnace Woods successful, including a trial period with an
FM wireless hearing aid system and a sign language inter-
preter. A number of teachers and staff members also had
agreed to take a sign language course to assist them in work-
ing with Amy. After the trial period was over, they would
develop an IEP for Amy.
Before the IEP meeting was held, the Rowleys filed a
complaint under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973. The complaint, filed with the Civil Rights Division of
the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
alleged that the school district had violated Amy's civil
rights because it had failed to provide a sign language inter-
preter. The Rowleys were represented by the National Cen-
ter for Law and Education. The complaint convinced many
officials in the school district that they were being targeted
in a national effort to create a test case regarding students
with disabilities (Smith, 1996). Later that year, the Office of
Civil Rights ruled that the school district was in compliance
with Section 504 and dismissed the complaint.
In January 1978, an IEP meeting was held, and shortly
thereafter a sign-language interpreter was assigned to Amy's
class. After tbe 9-day trial period, the sign language inter-
preter reported that Amy usually resisted the assistance, and
that because Amy was doing quite well, sbe did not need a
sign language interpreter at that time. He did note, however,
that Amy may need an interpreter in the future when acade-
mic work would become more difficult and large-group dis-
cussions would be used more frequently.
School officials decided that an interpreter would not be
provided for Amy. A few weeks later, the team reconvened to
write Amy's IEP for first grade. The school offered to pro-
vide Amy witb the services of a speech and auditory special-
ist twice a week, as well as tutorial assistance from a teacher
certified to teach deaf students. Tbe Rowleys refused to sign
the IEP. They hired a lawyer, Michael Chatoff, who also was
deaf. He believed that the best way to proceed would be to
request a due process hearing under the EAHCA.
In December 1978, a due process bearing was beld. A
month later, the hearing officer found that Furnace Woods
Elementary Scbool was providing Amy with an appropriate
education. An appeal of tbe bearing was beard by the New
York Commissioner of Education. In a brief decision issued
in April 1979, tbe Commissioner upheld tbe due process
bearing officer's finding. Tbe Rowleys filed suit against tbe
Hendrick Hudson Central Scbool District in tbe United
States District Court for tbe Soutbern District of New York.
The Federal District Court Decision
In September and October 1979, tbe suit was beard by
Judge Vincent Broderick of tbe U.S. District Court (Amy
Rowley v. Hendrick Hudson Central School District, 1979).
In December, Judge Broderick issued a two-page opinion
reversing tbe finding of tbe Commissioner of Education and
ordering tbe Hendrick Hudson Scbool District to provide
Amy witb a sign language interpreter. In bis opinion, tbe
judge wrote tbat tbe district had not provided Amy witb an
appropriate education, wbicb be defined as an education tbat
would result in "eacb bandicapped cbild being given an
opportunity to acbieve bis full potential commensurate witb
tbe opportunity provided otber cbildren" (p. 534).
Tbe judge furtber wrote tbat sucb a standard would
require tbat tbe potential of a cbild witb disabilities be mea-
sured and compared to bis or ber performance, and tbat tbe
resulting difference be compared to tbe difference experi-
enced by nondisabled cbildren. Judge Broderick also con-
cluded tbat, because of ber disability, Amy was not learning
as much or performing as well as sbe could bave if sbe did
not bave a disability, and tbat a sign language interpreter
would belp to alleviate tbe difference between ber potential
and wbat sbe actually was learning. Tbe scbool district
appealed tbe district court's decision to tbe United States
Court of Appeals for tbe Second Circuit.
The Court of Appeals Decision
On May 1980, tbe Rowley case went before tbe tbree-
judge panel of tbe U.S. Court of Appeals. In July of tbat
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year, the Court of Appeals issued its ruling, a 2-to-1 decision
affirming the decision of the district court. In a short three-
page opinion, the court found that without a sign language
interpreter, Amy did not have the same opportunity that her
classmates had. The court did not discuss the meaning of the
word "appropriate" in the EAHCA; rather, it noted the nar-
row scope of the ruling. The dissenting judge, however,
wrote a 19-page opinion strongly defending the actions of
the school district. Moreover, the dissenting judge disagreed
with the district court's definition of "appropriate."
In December 1980, the school district appealed the circuit
court's ruling to the United States Supreme Court. In Novem-
ber 1982, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. In March
1982, arguments were held before the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court Decision
When the Supreme Court announced that it would review
the Rowley case, many advocates for students with disabili-
ties were upset and worried, although they continued to sup-
port the Rowleys (Smith, 1996). There were several reasons
for the dislike of this specific case being the first special
education case to be heard by the U.S. Supreme Court:
1. Because Amy was not a typical child in special edu-
cation program (she was very bright and was doing
well in school), the facts were far less compelling
than if she were not bright and failing badly in
school.
2. The school district was in fact providing Amy with
an array of services, unlike many children in special
education programs who received minimal or no ser-
vices whatsoever.
3. The timing seemed bad because the court had be-
come more conservative, and advocacy groups wor-
ried that the high court may use the case to raze the
EAHCA and possibly declare the law unconstitutional.
The Rowleys' attorney, Michael Chatoff, who had been
with them since the original due process hearing, was to
argue their case before the Supreme Court. Interestingly, this
was the first time that a deaf lawyer would speak in front of
the Supreme Court, the first occasion that real-time transla-
tion equipment would be used in the high court, and only the
second time that Chatoif had ever argued a case in any court.
In the oral arguments, the school district's attorney began
by emphasizing the special services the district had provided
to Amy (i.e., having the staff take a sign language course,
installing the TTY communication device in the principal's
office, positioning Amy where she could make eye contact
with everyone in the classroom, supplying Amy with an FM
wireless hearing aid, having a teacher of the deaf work with
Amy for an hour each day, and providing Amy with speech
therapy services three times a week) and argued that Amy,
given her high IQ, was performing exactly as she was
expected to achieve.
He also argued that the school district had built "bridges
of meaning" to Amy, and the courts had destroyed these
bridges and substituted their own ideas of appropriate pro-
gramming based on an inaccurate reading of the EAHCA
(Smith, 1996, p. 141). The attorney further asserted that the
full potential standard announced by the district court was
simply unworkable.
The Rowleys' attorney argued that the case was not about
Amy reaching her full potential. Rather, the case was about
the school district's failing to develop an educational pro-
gram that met Amy's unique needs and provided her with
equal educational opportunity.
The Supreme Court's decision was announced on June
29, 1982. The majority opinion, written by Justice Rehn-
quist, ruled that the Hendrick Hudson School District had
provided an appropriate education to Amy. Justice Rehn-
quist's opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Powell, O'Conner, and Stevens, held that Congress had
intended that to deliver a FAPE, school districts had to pro-
vide personalized instruction with sufficient support ser-
vices to permit a child with a disability to benefit educa-
tionally, which had been satisfied in this case.
Justice White wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Jus-
tices Brennan and Marshall, in which he concluded that in
the EAHCA, Congress had intended that, to satisfy the
FAPE requirement, a school had to provide equal educa-
tional opportunity to a student with a disability. Justice
Blackmun filed a concurring opinion, in which he also con-
cluded that Congress intended that schools provide equal
educational opportunity; however, he determined that the
Hendrick Hudson School District had met this standard.
The majority noted that the EAHCA required that special
education services be provided at public expense, meet state
standards, and comport with the student's IEP. If individual-
ized instruction allowed the child to benefit from educa-
tional services and was provided in conformity with the
other requirements of the law, the student was receiving a
FAPE. The court noted that any substantive standard pre-
scribing the level of education to be accorded students with
disabilities was absent from the language of IDEA, and that
Congress had sought primarily to make public education
available to children with disabilities. Thus, according to the
court, "The intent of the (EAHCA) was more to open the
doors of public education to handicapped children on appro-
priate terms than to guarantee any particular level of educa-
tion once inside" (Rowley, 1982, p. 183).
The Supreme Court developed a two-part test for courts
to use in determining whether a school has met its obliga-
tions under IDEA to provide a FAPE:
First, has the [school] complied with the procedures of the
Act? And second, is the individualized education program
developed through the Act's procedures reasonably calcu-
lated to enable the child to receive educational benefits?
(Rowley, 1982, pp. 206-207).
If these obligations were met, a school had complied with
FAPE's requirements. The court cautioned the lower courts,
however, that it was not establishing any one test for deter-
mining the adequacy of educational benefits.
Applying the two-part test to the facts of the Rowley
case, the Supreme Court found that the school district had
complied with the procedures of IDEA and Amy had
received an appropriate education because she was perform-
ing better tban many children in her class and was advanc-
ing easily from grade to grade. In a footnote, the high court
noted that the decision was a narrow one, and that it should
not be read too broadly. The Court stated that the ruling
should not be interpreted to mean that every student with a
disability who was advancing from grade to grade in a reg-
ular school was automatically receiving a FAPE. Rather, the
FAPE standard could be arrived at only through a multifac-
torial evaluation conducted on a case-by-case basis. The
high court also noted tbat in this case the sign language
interpreter was not required to provide a FAPE to Amy Row-
ley. The decisions of the district court and circuit court were
reversed.
For the past 25 years, the Rowley decision undoubtedly
has been the most important and influential case in special
education law (Johnson, 2003). The Rowley standard—that
school districts had to provide special education programs
that conferred educational benefit, and that what constituted
a FAPE had to be determined by IEP teams on a case-by-
case basis—has guided school districts' thinking about these
issues. Still, the Rowley standard has evolved in subsequent
court cases. We next examine some of these post-^ow/ey
decisions.
POST-ROWLEY COURT DECISIONS
Because Congress did not specify any specific level of
educational benefit that must be provided to special educa-
tion students in the EAHCA, and the Supreme Court in
Rowley did not establish a single test for determining FAPE,
other courts have often been called on to interpret what con-
stitutes a FAPE for students with disabilities and whether
these students have received educational benefits from the
special education provided to them. Of course, these courts
have relied on the Rowley decision in ruling on such cases
because it is the standard against which special education
services are measured (Johnson, 2003).
• These decisions have followed the Rowley standard by
ruling that the EAHCA does not require that school-based
teams develop IEPs that provide students with the best pos-
sible education, nor does it require that students receive ser-
vices that enable them to reach their maximum potential.
Nonetheless, some courts have expanded on what has some-
times been referred to as the Rowley "some educational ben-
efit" standard, although it still remains essentially intact
(Johnson, 2003, p. 1).
The Meaningful Benefit Standard
Some courts have ruled that to provide a FAPE, schools
must develop special education programs that enable their
students with disabilities to achieve meaningful benefit, and
that the student must make some tangible progress. For
example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in
Polk V. Central Susquehana Intermediate Unit 16 (1988),
held that the EAHCA requires that IEPs be developed that
confer more than trivial or de minimus educational benefit
but lead to meaningful benefit and significant learning.
In the Polk decision, the court noted that because Rowley
involved a student who did very well in the general educa-
tion class, the high court was able to avoid the substantive
second principle of the Rowley test (i.e., whether the IEP
was reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit)
and concentrate on the procedural principle. Thus, because
Amy Rowley was an excellent student, the court had only to
examine the procedures the district followed, and the court
found that clearly she must have been receiving an appro-
priate education because she was one of the top students in
her class and had been advanced to tbe next grade. In the
case before the third circuit court, however, the substantive
question of how much benefit was required to meet the
"meaningful" standard in educating the plaintiff, Christo-
pher Polk, was inescapable.
Christopher Polk was a 14-year-old with severe mental
and physical disabilities. The severity of his disabilities
necessitated physical therapy, but the school's IEP provided
only the consultative services of a physical therapist.
Christopher's parents brought action under the EAHCA,
claiming that the school had failed to provide an appropriate
education for their son. A federal district court held for the
school district, finding that the Rowley standard held that the
conferral of any degree of educational benefit, no matter
how small, could qualify as an appropriate education. The
circuit court reversed the district court, declaring that
Congress did not write a blank check, neither did it antici-
pate that states would engage in the idle gesture of provid-
ing special education designed to confer only trivial bene-
fit.... Congress intended to afford children with special
needs an education that would confer meaningful benefit.
(Polk, 1988, p. 184)
The court also stated that the type of education that con-
stitutes a meaningful education can be determined only in
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light of a student's potential. Courts in Board of Education
of East Windsor Regional School District v. Diamond
(1986), Doe v. Smith (1988), and Hall v. Vance County
Board of Education (1985) all reached a similar conclusion.
In Cypress-Eairbanks Independent School District v.
Michael E, (1997), tbe U.S. Court of Appeals for tbe Fiftb
Circuit also relied on earlier rulings of otber circuits (see
Board of Education of East Windsor Regional School Dis-
trict v. Diamond, 1986; Hall v, Vance County Board of Edu-
cation, 1985) in deciding tbat to confer a FAPE, a student's
educational benefits cannot be a mere modicum or de min-
imis, but must be "likely to produce progress, not regression
or trivial educational advancement." In sbort, tbe educa-
tional benefit tbat an IEP is designed to acbieve must be
"meaningful" (Cypress, 1997, p. 248). Tbe court adopted tbe
district court's following four indicators to analyze wbetber
an IEP bad been reasonably calculated to provide a mean-
ingful benefit under IDEA:
1. Tbe program must be individualized on tbe basis of
tbe student's assessment and performance.
2. Tbe program must be administered in tbe least
restrictive environment.
3. Tbe services must be provided in a coordinated and
collaborative manner by the key stakebolders.
4. Positive academic and nonacademic benefits must be
demonstrated.
Courts also bave ruled tbat to confer a meaningful edu-
cation, some students' special education programs sbould
include more tban traditional academic skills and develop
students' basic self-belp and social skills sucb as toilet train-
ing, dressing, feeding, and communication (see Battle v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 1980; Polk v. Central
Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 1988; and Timothy W. v.
Rochester School District, 1989). In Polk, tbe Tbird Circuit
decided tbat because a cbild "may never acbieve tbe goals
set in a traditional classroom does not undermine tbe fact
tbat bis brand of education (training in basic life skills) is an
essential part of [tbe Act's] mandate" (p. 183). Tbe Eirst Cir-
cuit in Timothy W, concluded tbat education need not be
measured by acquiring traditional academic skills; ratber,
education was to be broadly defined to include a cbild's
social, emotional, medical, or educational problems.
Tbese post-Rowley decisions bave sbown tbat courts will
adbere to tbe controlling authority of Rowley and will apply
tbe Rowley standard wben ruling on issues of FAPE. Tbese
rulings also show, bowever, tbat many courts bave moved
beyond tbe "some educational benefit" standard and bave
required tbat students receive meaningful benefit or make
meaningful progress (see Burlington School Committee v,
Massachusetts Department of Education, 1985; Board of
Education of East Windsor Regional School District v. Dia-
mond, 1986; Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit
16, 1988; Roland M, v. Concord School Committee, 1990;
Chris C, V, Gwinnett County School District, 1991; / C. v.
Regional School District, 1996; Hall v, Vance County Board
of Education, 1985; Cypress-Eairbanks Independent School
District v, Michael E, 1997; Ridgewood Board of Education
V, N, E., 1999; Ross v, Eramington School Committee, 1999;
Nein v. Greater Clark County School Corporation, 1999).
Altbougb tbese decisions did not require a scbool to deliver
tbe best possible education, or to maximize students' poten-
tial, tbe rulings did stress tbe importance of examining a stu-
dent's potential and ability wben determining wbetber be or
sbe (a) progressed and (b) received demonstrable educa-
tional benefit (Jobnson, 2003).
IEPs and FAPE
Courts also bave addressed tbe question of bow to deter-
mine wbetber a scbool district bas provided a EAPE. Tbeir
answers bave often been to examine a student's IEP. Tbe
U.S. Court of Appeals for tbe Fourth Circuit, in Hall v,
Vance County Board of Education (1985), beld tbat tbe
Rowley decision required courts to examine IEPs to deter-
mine wbat substantive standards meet tbe second principle
of tbe Rowley test. In addition, tbe court cited Rowley as
stating tbat tbis could be accomplisbed only on a case-by-
case basis.
Tbe appeals court affirmed tbe district court's ruling tbat
because tbe plaintiff, wbo bad a learning disability, bad made
no educational progress in tbe public scbool, and because tbe
IEP was inadequate, tbe scbool district bad to reimburse tbe
parents for private scbool tuition. Tbe court noted tbat Con-
gress did not intend scbools to offer educational programs
tbat produce only trivial academic advancement.
In Carter v. Elorence County School District Eour
(1991), tbe U.S. Court of Appeals for tbe Fourtb Circuit
affirmed a district court's ruling tbat tbe scbool district's IEP
bad failed to satisfy tbe FAPE requirement of IDEA. Tbe
IEP, wbicb contained annual reading goals of 4-montbs'
growtb over a scbool year, did not, according to tbe district
court and tbe circuit court, represent meaningful growtb,
even if tbe goals were achieved. Tbus, tbe scbool district's
IEP was ruled invalid. Later, tbe case was beard by tbe U.S.
Supreme Court on a different issue.
In J, C, V, Central Regional School District (1996), tbe
U.S. Court of Appeals for tbe Tbird Circuit ruled tbat scbool
districts must provide more tban a de minimus or trivial edu-
cation, and tbat districts are responsible for adequacy of tbe
IEP. In tbis case, tbe IEP developed for a student witb severe
disabilities failed to address important educational needs.
Furtbermore, tbe student bad made little progress in tbe cur-
rent program and bad actually regressed in some areas.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Hous-
ton Independent School District v. Bobby R. (2000), ruled
that the student with learning disabilities received an appro-
priate education because the school had data showing that
the student had received academic and nonacademic benefit.
Moreover, the circuit adopted the four-part test used by the
circuit court in the Cypress-Fairbanks case. To determine if
academic benefits had been demonstrated, the court exam-
ined the school's testing data. Finding that Bobby's test
scores had shown a good rate of improvement, even though
it was not commensurate with his peers in general educa-
tion, the court held that the student's progress should be
measured in relation to his own degree of improvement
rather than in relation to his nondisabled peers. The court
ruled, therefore, that Bobby's IEP was reasonably calculated
to provide him with meaningful educational benefit, thus
meeting the requirements of IDEA.
In Pace v. Bogalusa City School Board (2003), the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit looked to Rowley and
its earlier rulings (Cypress-Fairbanks, 1997; Houston Inde-
pendent School District v. Bobby /?., 2000) for guidance in
deciding whether a student's IEP was reasonably calculated
to enable him to receive educational benefits. Relying on the
language that it had used in Cypress-Fairbanks, the court
stated that a FAPE as described in an IEP
need not be the best possible one, nor one that will maxi-
mize the child's educational potential; rather, it need only be
an education that is specifically designed to meet the child's
unique needs, supported by services that will permit him "to
benefit" from the instruction, (p. 619)
The court used the four factors that it had adopted in
Cypress to determine whether the IEP was reasonably cal-
culated to provide him with an educational benefit. Objec-
tive evidence, in the form of test scores, indicated that the
student had made academic gains. In addition, he met the
goals to improve his flexibility, mobility, and trunk strength.
The court concluded that the student had "received both pos-
itive academic and non-academic benefits from his educa-
tional program" (p. 620).
These decisions show that courts often will examine a
school district's IEP when determining whether the district
provided a FAPE (Osborne & Russo, 2006). The IEP is the
blueprint of a student's FAPE, and all special education
teachers must understand its purpose and function (Huefner,
2000; Yell, 2006).
The importance of an IEP to help courts determine
whether a FAPE was provided to a student was underscored
by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Lascari v. Board of
Education (1989). In this case, the New Jersey high court
determined that the student had not received a FAPE
because the' IEP was done so poorly. Specifically, the court
found that the current levels of performance were not com-
plete, the goals and objectives were so vague as to be mean-
ingless, and the IEP contained no method for measuring stu-
dent progress toward the goals. For these reasons, the court
found that the IEP was inappropriate, resulting in the denial
of FAPE (Huefner, 2000). These decisions indicate that
courts often use the IEP as the primary mechanism for deter-
mining whether a FAPE is being provided (Huefner, 2000;
Yell, 2006).
FAPE AND THE IDEA REAUTHORIZATIONS
OE 1997 AND 2004
IDEA Amendments of 1997
When the EAHCA was passed in 1975, Congress
intended that the law open the doors of public education for
students with disabilities. Thus, the emphasis ofthe original
law was on access to educational programs rather than any
level of educational opportunity (Eyer, 1998; Huefner, 2000;
Yell, 2006; Yell & Drasgow, 2000). The EAHCA required
reauthorization by Congress every 4 or 5 years. In 1990,
when Congress reauthorized the EAHCA, it also changed
the name of the law to the Individuals with Disabilities Edu-
cation Act (IDEA). When Congress reauthorized IDEA in
1997 (hereafter IDEA '97), its intent seemingly was to
change the focus of the law.
Although IDEA had been dramatically successful in
including children with disabilities in public education.
Congress believed that the promise of the law had not been
fulfilled for too many children with disabilities. Congres-
sional intent in the 1997 reauthorizations was stated most
clearly in the House Committee Report:
This Committee believes that the critical issue now is to
place greater emphasis on improving student performance
and ensuring that children with disabilities receive a quality
public education.... This reauthorization of the IDEA is
needed to move to the next step of providing special educa-
tion and related services to children with disabilities: to
improve and increase their educational achievement. (House
Report, 1997, pp. 83-84)
The underlying theme of IDEA '97, therefore, was to
improve the effectiveness of special education by requiring
demonstrable improvements in the educational achievement
of students with disabilities (Eyer, 1998; Yell, 2006). Indeed,
providing a quality education that would produce real edu-
cational results for each student with disabilities had became
the new goal of IDEA (Eyer, 1998; Johnson, 2003).
In IDEA '97, Congress included a number of changes in
the IEP requirements to emphasize the necessity of improv-
ing educational outcomes for students with disabilities. For
example, IDEA '97 required that IEPs contain measurable
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annual goals and the methods by which a student's progress
toward his or her goals would be measured. In addition,
IDEA '97 required that IEP teams had to regularly inform
parents of students in special education of their child's
progress toward his or her annual goals and the extent to
which this progress is sufficient to enable the child to
achieve these goals.
According to IDEA '97, the purpose of measurable
annual goals is to inform the IEP team as to whether (a) the
anticipated outcomes for the student are being met, and (b)
the special education services and placement are effective
(IDEA Regulations, 34 C.F.R., Appendix to Part 300—
Notice of Interpretation, question 38). Thus, IDEA '97 con-
veyed the clear requirement that if a student fails to make
progress toward his or her annual goals, the IEP has to be
revised (Clark, 1999). The reauthorized law required that the
special education services that were determined in the IEP
planning process must allow a student to advance appropri-
ately toward attaining his or her annual goals.
IDEA '97 also focused on the importance of ensuring
that students with disabilities would participate and progress
in the general education curriculum. By requiring access to
the general curriculum. Congress intended that students
with disabilities would be more likely to meet "the educa-
tional standards within the jurisdiction of the public agency
that apply to all children" (IDEA Regulations, §300.26(b)
(3)(ii)). To ensure that students with disabilities would be
held to the same high standards expected of all general edu-
cation students, IDEA '97 also required that students with
disabilities be included in statewide assessments or be pro-
vided with an alternative assessment. Thus, IDEA '97 incor-
porated the high expectations of state education agencies
into the IEPs of students with disabilities (Johnson, 2003;
Yell & Shriner, 1997).
The 1997 amendments to IDEA seemed to clearly raise
the FAPE standard to more than just a floor of opportunity
(Eyer, 1998; Huefner, 2000; Johnson, 2003; Yell & Shriner,
1997). In fact, Eyer (1998) wrote that after the reauthoriza-
tion in 1997:
the tDEA can no longer be fairly perceived as a statute
which merely affords children access to education. Today,
the IDEA is designed to improve the effectiveness of special
education and increase the benefits afforded to children with
disabilities to the extent such benefits are necessary to
achieve measurable progress, (p. 16)
Similarly, when IDEA was reauthorized in 2004, congres-
sional intent clearly was on improving instructional out-
comes for students with disabilities.
IDEA Amendments of 2004
Prior to reauthorization of IDEA in 2004, President
George W. Bush appointed a commission to study special
education in America and to make recommendations for
reauthorization. In the introduction to the final report of the
President's Commission on Excellence in Special Educa-
tion, A New Era: Revitalizing Special Education for Chil-
dren and Their Families (President's Commission, 2001),
the Commission wrote:
The President earnestly desires a new era in special educa-
tion—one that doesn't seek to meet minimum requirements,
but rather embraces increased academic achievement and
real results for every child with a disability. (President's
Commission, 2001, p. 4)
Thus, major recommendation number 1 made by tbe Com-
mission was tbat educators must focus on results, not on
process. Tbe Commission wrote:
IDEA must return to its educational mission: serving the
needs of every child. While the law must retain the legal and
procedural safeguards necessary to guarantee a "free appro-
priate public education" for children with disabilities, IDEA
will only fulfill its intended purpose if it raises its expecta-
tions for students and becomes results-oriented—not driven
by process, litigation, regulation and confrontation. In short,
the system must be judged by the opportunities it provides
and the outcomes achieved by each child. (President's Com-
mission, 2001, p. 8)
Congress embraced this charge, as indicated in the fol-
lowing statement of findings in Part A of the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (IDEIA):
Improving educational results for children with disabilities
is an essential element of our national policy of ensuring
equality of opportunity, full participation, independent liv-
ing, and economic self-sufficiency for individuals with dis-
abilities" (IDEA, § l4OI(c)(l)).
According to the findings of fact in tbe IDEIA, "the Federal
Government [has] a supporting role in assisting State and
local efforts to educate children with disabilities in order to
improve results for such children" (IDEA, § 1401 (c)(6)). In
the regulations written to implement the IDEIA, the U.S
Department of Education wrote that the purpose of the
IDEA amendments of 2004 were "to assess and ensure the
effectiveness of efforts to educate students with disabilities"
(IDEA Regulations, § 300. l(d)).
In the IDEIA, Congress retained and expanded many of
the requirements of IDEA '97, such as involvement in the
general education curriculum, participation in statewide
assessments, and the emphasis on developing measurable
annual goals for eacb student in special education, monitoring
each student's progress, and then reporting on this progress to
bis or her parents. Congress also added a few requirements,
the most notable of which was the mandate that IEP teams
base tbeir programming on peer-reviewed research.
Students' IEPs now must include a statement of the spe-
cial education and related services and supplementary aids
and services, based on peer-reviewed research, to tbe extent
practicable. Inclusion of tbe terminology "peer-reviewed
research" is significant. Wben an IEP team develops a stu-
dent's special education program, tbe services tbat are pro-
vided must be based on reliable evidence tbat tbe program
or service works.
Altbougb IDEIA does not define peer-reviewed research,
use of tbis term clearly is in accordance witb NCLB's
requirement regarding scientifically based research (IDEA
Regulations, 34 C.F.R. § 300.315 et seq.). According to tbe
language in NCLB (No Cbild Left Bebind, 20 U.S.C. §
141 l(e)(2)(C)(xi)), scientifically based researcb applies tbe
rigorous, systematic, and objective methods of science to
examine and validate instructional procedures. Tbis researcb
(a) relies on direct observation and objective measurement
(not speculation) to provide valid data; (b) controls, exam-
ines, or assesses factors to eliminate alternative explana-
tions; (c) uses rigorous data analysis; and (d) is published in
peer-reviewed journals. Furtber, all professional develop-
ment activities and use of funds must be grounded in scien-
tifically based researcb and must be directed at improving
student academic acbievement.
Tbis new requirement will result in stronger and more
effective programs for students witb disabilities in special
education. Researcb in recent years bas enabled great
advances in tbe areas of learning and bebavior problems and
effective procedures to remedy tbem. Tbe President's Com-
mission on Excellence in Special Education (2001) recom-
mended tbat wben IDEA was reautborized. Congress sbould
empbasize "aggressive intervention using researcb-based
approacbes" (President's Commission, p. 7). Furtber, tbe
Commission wrote tbat all professional development activi-
ties for special education teacbers must be grounded in sci-
entifically based researcb and must focus on improving stu-
dent academic acbievement. It bas always been good
practice to know and implement researcb-based procedures.
Now tbis is a requirement in tbe law.
Tbe IDEIA also included a provision explicitly requiring
tbat "a decision made by a bearing officer sball be made on
substantive grounds based on a determination of wbetber tbe
cbild received a free appropriate public education." (20
U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(i)). Procedural violations may result
in denial of a FAPE only if tbese violations (a) impeded tbe
cbild's rigbt to a free appropriate public education, (b) sig-
nificantly impeded tbe parents' opportunity to participate in
tbe decision-making process regarding tbe provision of a
free appropriate public education to a student cbild, or (c)
caused a deprivation of educational benefits (IDEA, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii)). Yell, Katsiyannis, Ryan, McDuffie,
and Mattocks (in press) concluded tbat Congress clearly
intended to ensure tbat bearing officers examine wbetber tbe
student was afforded meaningful educational benefits ratber
tban just determining wbetber tbe scbool district adbered to
tbe procedures of tbe law.
Conclusions: FAPE, IDEA '97, and the IDEIA
For tbe past 25 years, tbe Rowley decision bas provided
tbe framework for courts to use wben determining wbetber
students were provided witb a FAPE. An analysis of tbe
IDEA reauthorizations of 1997 and 2004, bowever, clearly
indicates tbat IDEA is no longer about merely providing
access to education, nor is it just about affording students a
basic floor of opportunity. Tbe law now embraces researcb,
progress monitoring, and accountability. Tbe law demands
improved results for students witb disabilities. Clearly, tbis
will require cbanges in tbe ways tbat scbool-based teams
develop IEPs, and tbis, in turn, sbould influence courts on
bow tbey view and assess FAPE (Jobnson, 2003).
An examination of tbe post-Rowley decisions indicates
tbat many courts, wbile moving beyond tbe "some educa-
tional benefit" standard to a "meaningful education benefit"
standard, still rely on tbe Rowley standard for guidance
wben determining if a student bas received a FAPE. On one
band, tbis is understandable because tbe U.S. Supreme
Court is tbe bigbest court in tbe land, lower courts follow tbe
autbority of tbe bigb court, and for 25 years Rowley bas pro-
vided tbe structure for deciding FAPE cases. On tbe otber
band, tbe puzzling aspect of tbis reliance sbown by some
lower courts is tbat tbe "some educational benefit" standard
no longer accurately reflects tbe cbanges Congress made to
IDEA in tbe reautborizations of 1997 and 2004, and because
of tbese cbanges, lower courts can go beyond Rowley in
interpreting tbe FAPE mandate.
Tbe cbanges in IDEA will eventually result in a funda-
mental alteration in tbe ways in wbicb tbe courts view a
FAPE. Tbe language in tbe first section of IDEA, titled
"Findings," maintains tbat "tbe implementation of (IDEA)
bas been impeded by low expectations, and an insufficient
focus on applying replicable researcb on proven methods of
teaching and learning for cbildren witb disabilities" (IDEA
§ 1400 (c)(4)), and tbat:
almost 30- years of research and experience has demon-
strated that the education of children with disabilities can be
made more effective by—
(A) having high expectations for such children and ensuring
their access to the general education curriculum in the regu-
lar classroom, to the maximum extent possible, in order to—
(i) meet developmental goals and, to the maximum extent
possible, the challenging expectations that have been estab-
lished for all children; and
(ii) be prepared to lead productive and independent adult
lives, to the maximum extent possible. (IDEA § 1400 (c)(5))
Clearly, tbe plain meaning of tbe law is no longer about
simply providing access, a basic floor of opportunity, and
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some educational benefit. In 25 years, the times and the
definition of FAPE have changed. A quarter century ago, the
Rowley standard reflected the intent of Congress in fashioning
the EAHCA; however, it no longer does. Given the knowl-
edge we have accumulated in 25 years of research on educat-
ing students with disabilities, providing services that merely
offer some educational benefit is no longer acceptable.
What will it take for the courts to go beyond Rowley and
embrace the definition of FAPE in the new IDEA? Two
important points that we must acknowledge are that
1. courts don't make the law; the courts interpret the
law, and
2. the U.S. Supreme Court will not voluntarily answer
questions unless they are directly asked.
Thus, a direct challenge to the Rowley standard may be
required, in which a court, or the Supreme Court, is asked to
reinterpret FAPE given the plain meaning of the new IDEA.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SPECIAL
EDUCATORS, ADMINISTRATORS, AND
TEACHER TRAINERS
IDEA now requires that special educator programs con-
fer meaningful educational benefit, and that these programs
are grounded in research-based practices. Yell, Shriner, and
Katsiyannis (2006) proposed five guidelines to help ensure
that special education programs meet the requirements of
the IDEIA. We offer these suggestions for special education
teachers and administrators to follow in developing educa-
tional programs that meet the requirements of IDEA and
confer meaningful educational benefit to the students with
whom they work.
Recommendation #1: Ensure that teachers and adminis-
trators understand the essence of a FAPE in accordance
with IDEA '97 and the IDEIA.
IDEA is a complex law, and special educators, adminis-
trators, and teacher trainers have to understand the require-
ment that special education programs meet the FAPE
requirements. To ensure that public schools fulfill these
obligations, special educators must
1. conduct relevant assessments of students that provide
information to teachers on a student's unique acade-
mic and functional needs and how best to address
those needs;
2. develop meaningful educational programs for stu-
dents based on the assessment, which consists of
special education and related services grounded in
research-based practices;
3. generate measurable annual goals that will be used to
monitor a student's academic and functional progress;
and
4. monitor the student's progress by collecting data on
his or her growth toward those goals, and make
instructional changes when necessary.
IDEIA emphasizes the importance of meaningful program-
ming by stressing the importance of the outcomes of a stu-
dent's education.
Recommendation #2: Ensure that speciat education
teachers understand and use research-based procedures.
The importance of using research-based educational pro-
cedures is stressed in both NCLB and IDEIA. Because of
the IDEA requirement that special education programs
deliver meaningful benefit, this level of benefit likely will
not be realized when ineffective instructional strategies are
used. Thus, teachers must understand and properly imple-
ment educational practices based on the latest research.
Quite simply, special education programming must produce
meaningful educational benefit, and the way that adminis-
trators and teachers can ensure this is to use educational pro-
cedures that show evidence of producing meaningful out-
comes. In addition to understanding and being able to
implement research-based practices, special educators will
need in-depth knowledge of available resources and be able
to distinguish legitimate research from fads and educational
procedures lacking an evidence base.
Recommendation #3: Ensure that special education
teachers know how to collect and use formative data to
monitor student progress.
IDEIA increases the federal mandate that requires teach-
ers to monitor student progress. It accomplishes this in four
major ways (Yell, Shriner, & Katsiyannis, 2006):
1. The law requires that IEP team members develop
'measurable annual goals in students' IEPs.
2. The IEP must delineate how these goals will be mea-
sured. That is, special education teachers must use a
progress monitoring system.
3. Special education teachers must monitor a student's
progress toward meeting these annual goals at least
every 9 weeks and report the student's progress to his
or her parents.
4. Teachers must make instructional changes when a
student's progress is not sufficient to achieve his or
her goals.
Thus, the law requires that a student's IEP includes annual
goals that can be measured, and that teachers actually mea-
sure progress toward these goals. Moreover, instructional
changes must be made when the data indicate that a student
is not progressing.
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As discussed previously, IDEA now requires that special
educators develop and deliver individualized special educa-
tion programs that confer meaningful education benefits to
students in special education. To ensure that special educa-
tion programs confer meaningful benefit and, thus, meet
requirements of IDEA, special education teachers must be
able to collect data to determine if their instructional and'
behavioral programs are working and that their students are
making progress toward meeting their measurable annual
goals.
By using such data, teachers' educational decisions will
be guided by objective data. If the data show that a student
is not learning, the teacher can make instructional changes
and continue to collect data to determine if the instructional
changes are working. Teachers can adjust their instruction in
response to student performance (Yell & Stecker, 2003),
thereby ensuring that the educational programs confer
meaningful educational benefit.
Recommendation #4: Ensure that special education
teachers understand how to develop educationally mean-
ingful and legally sound IEPs.
To ensure that IEPs are educationally meaningful and
legally correct, special educators must (a) conduct assess-
ments that address a student's instructional needs, (b)
develop meaningful special education using researcb-based
strategies and procedures, (c) collect data to monitor student
progress and plan and adjust instruction based on the data,
and (d) report the student's progress to his or her parents
(Yell, Shriner, & Katsiyannis, 2006). Individualized educa-
tion programs that are based on inadequate assessments,
contain goals that are not individualized or appropriate, and
have no progress-monitoring component most likely will not
provide educational benefit.
Recommendation #5: Ensure that special education
teachers receive meaningful and sustained inservice
training programs to train them in new research-based
practices and other developments in special education.
Of paramount importance, administrators must ensure
that special education teachers have the necessary skills and
tools to implement evidence-based practices. There is a
huge gap between (a) what we know works from scientifi-
cally based research and (b) what actually is taught in many
classrooms (Yell & Drasgow, 2005). This means that teacher
trainers and school district administrators will have to struc-
ture preservice and inservice training activities to ensure that
teachers become fluent in research-based practices. In addi-
tion, they sbould know how to access research through peer-
reviewed literature. Administrators must develop mecha-
nisms to ensure that teachers receive regular and frequent
inservice training experiences in tbe latest peer-reviewed
research. Moreover, when an administrator evaluates a
teacher, the administrator should assess the extent to which
the teacher uses research-based practices.
SUMMARY
June 29, 2007, was the 25th anniversary of the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Board of Education of the Hen-
drick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley. This was
the first opportunity for the high court to interpret the FAPE
requirement of the EAHCA. The Supreme Court held that
EAPE was a right of all students in special education. Writ-
ing for the majority. Justice Rehnquist stated that a EAPE
consists of educational instruction designed to meet the
unique needs of a student with disabilities, supported by ser-
vices as needed to permit the student to benefit from instruc-
tion. The court noted that IDEA requires that these educa-
tional services be provided at public expense, meet state
standards, and comport with the student's IEP. If individual-
ized instruction allows the child to benefit from educational
services and is provided in conformity with the other
requirements of the law, the student is receiving a EAPE.
The Supreme Court also ruled that students with disabil-
ities do not have an enforceable right to the best possible
education or an education that allows them to achieve their
maximum potential. Ratber, they are entitled to an education
that is reasonably calculated to confer some educational
benefit.
In addition, tbe Supreme Court developed a two-part test
to be used by courts in determining if a school has met its
obligations under IDEA to provide a FAPE:
First, has the [school] complied with the procedures of the
Act? And second, is the individualized education program
developed through the Act's procedures reasonably calcu-
lated to enable the child to receive educational benefits? (pp.
206-207)
Court decisions immediately following the Rowley deci-
sion tended to apply the high court's ruling in a strict man-
ner. That is, they applied the Rowley test by first examining
the IEP and the procedural history of the case to determine
whether the first part of the test had been satisfied. Second,
the courts examined the student's IEP to determine whether
the IEP would confer some educational benefit. Often, if a
court found that the first part of the Rowley test was met and
the school district was able to sbow some educational bene-
fit, no matter bow minimal, the court upheld the school's
provision of a FAPE. Faced with difficult FAPE decisions,
however, some courts began to rule that the law's FAPE
requirement meant more than simple access to education.
These courts ruled that a FAPE must confer meaningful edu-
cational benefit on the student. An education conferring
minimal or trivial progress was insufficient.
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III,
In tbe 25 years since tbe Rowley decision, tbe major pur-
pose of IDEA bas sbifted from providing access to educa-
tional services to providing meaningful and measurable pro-
grams for students witb disabilities. We believe tbat scbools
and programs are now going to be beld to a bigber standard
in providing educational services for students witb disabili-
ties. Educators must be prepared to meet tbis challenge.
Tbese cbanges will eventually require tbe courts to reexam-
ine tbe Rowley ruling and tbe "some educational benefit"
standard. We bope tbe challenge comes sooner ratber tban
later.
Authors' Note
After losing tbe case in tbe Supreme Court, tbe Rowley
family moved from New York to New Jersey. Amy attended
a scbool tbat served a number of deaf cbildren and had ASL
interpreters available in classrooms. Sbe performed
extremely well during tbe rest of ber scbool career. Amy is
currently coordinator of tbe American Sign Language Pro-
gram in tbe Department of Exceptional Education, Univer-
sity of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, and is working on her PhD.
Sbe is married to Jeff Mosber, and they have three children.
Her two daughters, Janeva and Resa, are deaf and attend tbe
Milwaukee sign language scbool, wbicb is attended by botb
deaf and bearing children. Amy is still involved in working
to ensure that all cbildren witb disabilities bave access to an
appropriate—and meaningful—education.
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